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This paper investigates the capital structure of a large sample of U.S. private firms from 2004 to 2013. There is a considerable heterogeneity in private firm capital structure not only in terms of the level of leverage but also with regard to the issuance of specific debt instruments. Leverage, debt type usage, and debt specialization are dynamic and strongly related to observable firm characteristics largely in support of contract theory. Unobservable firm and industry characteristics are strong determinants of leverage levels and debt specialization. Macro credit conditions are not related to private firm leverage but are strong determinants of the degree to which firms diversify their debt capital structures.

The 1896 presidential election between William Jennings Bryan and William McKinley has new salience in the wake of the 2016 presidential contest. We provide the first systematic analysis of presidential voting in 1896, combining county-level returns with economic, financial, and demographic data. We show that Bryan did well where interest rates were high, railroad penetration was low, and crop prices had declined. We show that further declines in crop prices or increases in interest rates would have been enough to tip the Electoral College in Bryan’s favor. But to change the outcome, the additional changes would have had to be large.

The purpose of this study is to examine the role of board networks in promoting stock liquidity when there is high economic policy uncertainty using a sample of Brazilian firms from 2002 to 2015.

The study employs the ordinary least squares estimation method with standard errors clustered at the firm level for preliminary analysis, besides the study employs the two-step GMM dynamic estimation method to deal with potential endogeneity issues.

First, the findings show that economic policy uncertainty disproportionately contributes to stock illiquidity and the impact is mainly prominent for high risky companies, small firms and firms in competitive industries. Second, the author provides evidence that board networks promote stock liquidity more via the information channel when economic policy uncertainty is very high.

Given the adverse effects of economic policy uncertainty on stock liquidity, governments need to swiftly communicate and implement policies that affect the capital market to avoid the drying up of liquidity, which is exacerbated by communication or implementation lags. Also, there is a need for the regulators to continuously encourage the inclusion of independent directors in boards, which helps to increase board monitoring capacity and the firms' ability to respond to changes in the external environment.

Unlike other studies that focus on the adverse effects of economic policy uncertainty on firm outcomes, the novel contribution is that the author uncovers the role of board networks in mitigating the negative effects of economic policy uncertainty on stock liquidity.

Chester Whitney Wright (1879–1966) received his A.B. in 1901, A.M. in 1902 and Ph.D. in 1906, all from Harvard University. After teaching at Cornell University during 1906–1907, he taught at the University of Chicago from 1907 to 1944. Wright was the author of Economic History of the United States (1941, 1949); editor of Economic Problems of War and Its Aftermath (1942), to which he contributed a chapter on economic lessons from previous wars, and other chapters were authored by John U. Nef (war and the early industrial revolution) and by Frank H. Knight (the war and the crisis of individualism); and co-editor of Materials for the Study of Elementary Economics (1913). Wright’s Wool-Growing and the Tariff received the David Ames Wells Prize for 1907–1908, and was volume 5 in the Harvard Economic Studies. I am indebted to Holly Flynn for assistance in preparing Wright’s biography and in tracking down incomplete references; to Marianne Johnson in preparing many tables and charts; and to F. Taylor Ostrander, as usual, for help in transcribing and proofreading.

It is generally believed that the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act (SHTA) of 1930 was an electoral response on the part of the Republican Party to Midwestern farmers’ concerns in the 1928 general election which via the legislative process (pork-barreling and log-rolling) was transformed into a generalized upwards tariff revision. There are, however, problems with this view, not the least of which is the fact that the farmers themselves were well aware of the fact that higher tariffs would not improve their lot, and hence favored the price support/equalization measures found in the Haugen–McNary Farm Relief Bill. This paper presents an alternative explanation. Specifically, it is argued that the SHTA had its origins in manufacturing states where the demand for a comprehensive upward revision of tariffs was transformed via the electoral process – and not the legislative process – into an omnibus upward tariff revision that included agriculture. The omnibus nature of the bill, it is argued, was intended as both (i) an electoral strategy and (ii) a hedge against near-certain revolt in rural America over anticipated higher prices for manufactures. We show that while successful electorally (i.e., in the 1928 presidential election), the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Bill fell apart in the legislature in the summer of 1929 when 13 Insurgent Republicans broke with the party to vote with the Democrats to lower tariffs on manufactures.

Although there are contradictory reports in regard to the tinned meat scandal in America, there is not the least doubt that an appalling condition of things prevails, and to the ordinary person who knows little or nothing of the extent to which food adulteration and other such malpractices exist in this country as well as elsewhere, such revelations as those which have recently been made by the daily press must come as a shock. To those whose duty it is to acquaint themselves with the nature and quality of the food supply of the people, the revelations are not so startling. The layman would hardly believe that the cases of obscure poisoning which repeatedly occur, sometimes resulting in death, and sometimes producing more or less severe attacks of illness, are largely due to the use of bad tinned foods. According to various reports from reliable sources, some of the practices in vogue at the Chicago packing houses are too disgusting to be given publicity to, but the malpractices which have been revealed in connection with the manufacture of tinned meat products, such as the use of diseased carcases, filthy offal and sweepings, putrid and decomposed meat artificially coloured and preserved with boric acid or some other chemical preservative, of potted ham made from mouldy flesh, of sausages made from the sweepings of the packing houses where it is the habit of the employees to expectorate freely on the floor, will tend to make people refuse to purchase any kind of tinned food, and unfortunately the manufacturer of good and wholesome products is sure to suffer. As might have been anticipated, denials as to the allegations made have been put forward and circulated, no doubt at the instance of persons more or less interested in the maintenance of the practices referred to. It has been alleged that protection is afforded to the consumer by certain labels, which read, “Quality Guaranteed, Government Inspected,” but it appears from recent official reports that this statement in reality means nothing at all, and affords no guarantee whatever—which is precisely what we should have expected. The absurdity and criminality of permitting the admixture of chemical preservatives with articles of food are well illustrated by these exposures, and we have more justification than ever in asking that our own Government authorities will make up their minds to take the action which has so long and so forcibly been urged upon them with respect to this form of adulteration.

In the annals of marketing history and the history of marketing thought, there is a key figure whose influence from the mid‐twentieth century through to the present day is worthy of note, Dr Ernest Dichter. The purpose of this paper is to place Dichter's writings in appropriate context and posit that arguably more insight into this charismatic figure can be discerned by taking greater account of the Cold War (1946‐1991) climate in which he was working and writing.

This paper is best thought of as an example of biographically inflected research. The paper focuses on the “socially progressive” aspect of his writings in order to display Dichter's support for the American economic system in the Cold War climate of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. The author highlights how Dichter came to the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the mid‐1950s. What this paper underscores above and beyond all those that have explored aspects of Dichter's life is that his character was interpreted by respondents to FBI questioning in ways that reflected geopolitical circumstance.

Some of those interviewed by the Bureau praised him highly, whilst others labelled him a Communist, and accused his organisation of employing people with similar leanings. While Dichter may have had some limited associations with socialist doctrines in his early youth, such accusations were misplaced. But, overall, what this paper highlights is a highly malleable practitioner whose practices and writings both contributed to the society in which they were disseminated, but also shifted with the circumstances in which they circulated.

This paper adds an important dimension to the biography of Ernest Dichter which has not previously been explored.

This paper aims to determine why so many banks do not recognize in a timely manner the inherent risks and imbalances with their risk/reward decision trade-offs, to elevate the risk conversation by embracing a more strategic and adaptive behavioral perspective and to show how an effective risk management organizational mindset is a definite solution for mitigating risk.

A direct-mail questionnaire survey was designed with the unit of analysis US community bank (under US$1.5bn in assets) and its risk performance. We used quantitative methods using previously tested scales for main constructs and FDIC bank data for performance measures. To gauge the models capacity for determining discriminatory value, results were also measured against relative peer financial performance.

The findings established that an effective risk management process that assimilates risk tolerance, risk propensity and risk practices into a managerial mindset offers a sound solution for mitigating risk. By envisioning risk as a “conceptual model of thinking” and interpreting it as a “predictable business process”, and by offering specific “decision enablers” that complement the corporate mindset, it creates a safety net against unsafe risk practices. As a result, it allows for an appreciation that current financial performance is a direct measure of management’s risk decision capabilities.

The sample size (n = 151), although adequate for our purpose was relatively small, was restricted to US community banks (less than US$1.5bn in assets) and single-informants (CEOs), thereby providing a somewhat narrow focus. Also, the survey was conducted during a slow economic period, and results may be different during a growth period. We see ripe opportunity for further research, especially related to money-center and regional banks and the next level of management as well as the behavioral influences that frame the risk/reward opportunity. Research on other industries, small businesses, etc., would be valuable because risk permeates all decisioning.

From a practitioner perspective, providing guidance on risk oversight allows for improved financial performance. The findings should be of interest to financial industry leaders, policy makers and regulators as understanding how an active orientation of risk tolerance, risk propensity and risk practices are coordinated across the organization is vital. Also, managers need to understand how characteristics of risk management manifest itself within their organization in terms of productivity and financial performance.

This paper is the first comprehensive empirical study that incorporates a conceptual approach that uses outcome history, behavioral influences and operational dimensions to identify risk management capabilities in community banks designed to increase risk/reward awareness.